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Abstract 
Advanced distributed communication technologies play an important role today in the control and 
maintenance of safety-critical systems. However, the excessively optimistic reliance on the new 
technology without recognizing the threats against its successful functioning, being able to maintain 
barriers or/and eliminate or reduce the risks may result in impairments compromising the 
opportunities. At the current state of knowledge it is even unclear whether we can develop trustful 
causal paths between hazards of different natures and their consequences. Hazard identification 
and risk analysis have proved to be effective tools in developing more reliable and robust systems. 
As technology is developing fast though, a new need for an effective hazard identification 
methodology has emerged. To enhance the predictive performance of hazard identification in 
advanced distributed communication systems, we have envisioned and currently developing a 
multilevel-multidimensional HAZOP methodology. The methodology introduces a new creative 
thinking stimulation model to substitute the conventional guideword-based approaches that is 
based on a multiple level and dimension exploration of the system under consideration. This paper 
describes the work carried out to extend the standard HAZOP approaches to suit the analysis of 
new communication technologies based on a simple corrective maintenance scenario taking place 
at a Nuclear Power Plant. 
1. Introduction 
New communication technologies play an important role today in the control and maintenance of 
safety-critical systems. In the years to come, reliance on them will without any doubt grow, as they 
suggest benefits for operability, maintainability and efficiency of the systems up to the full 
automation of some functions which seemed infeasible some years ago. In particular, the new 
communication technology makes it possible to organize outage work process at NPPs and 
suggests impressive opportunities given by distributed computer technology. It is considered a 
logical next step towards enhancing team performance and the outage management process as a 
whole. However, excessively optimistic reliance on the new technology without recognizing the 
threats against its successful functioning can result in problems and delays in achieving the full 
benefits. Any new technology comes with new risks; and performing a risk analysis is necessary to 
introduce a more balanced view that pays attention to the threats inherent in the process. 
In advanced distributed information systems, risks can stem from hardware and software failures, 
unintentional human errors, intentional manipulation, lack of situational awareness in some specific 
scenarios, malicious acts, misinterpretation, etc.  At the current state of knowledge it is even 
unclear whether we can develop a full range of valid causal paths between hazards of different 
natures and their consequences.   
A Control Systems Hazard and Operability (CHAZOP) analysis is a systematic procedure to 
identify potential hazards and/or operability problems in control and computer systems. However a 
standardized CHAZOP analysis does not exist. Though, there are a number of distinctive CHAZOP 
procedures focusing on identifying hazards in different subsystems and layers of information 
   
systems, interfaces between them or/and different functional units. These can be programmable 
electronics, software, hardware inclusive communication devices and channels, human-machine 
interfaces and humans. Humans at the same time can perform very different functions at the 
systems and, as a consequence, can be viewed as different causes of risks. Some of the 
CHAZOPs can integrate few system levels and attempt to cover a wide range of possible 
deviations from the normal. However, while being operational and practical tools, none of them has 
so far been validated in order to be considered as a good engineering practice. Besides this, our 
experience in hazard identification and insights gained from an extensive review of the current 
methods make us believe that there is room for significant improvements in the predictability of 
hazards. 
To enhance the predictive performance of hazard identification in advanced distributed 
communication systems we have envisioned and currently developing a multilevel - 
multidimensional HAZOP methodology; the MLMD HAZOP.  
The diagrammatic causal representation of the system is made through the use of functional 
modelling methodologies which have a number of advantages over the use of other currently used 
representations as a basis for the analysis.  
Besides this and aiming at the completeness and repeatability of the analysis, we introduce a new 
creative thinking approach, to substitute the conventional guideword-based approaches. The 
approach is based on a multiple level and dimension exploration of the system in place. 
To demonstrate the approach, at this early stage of the project, we analyse a “toy” system 
developed through the initial design stages. The system chosen was one which follows the ethos in 
the Halden project “Outage Control Centres – Tools for Improved Team Performance” [1]. 
However, the actual “toy” case chosen is simpler and does not involve the complex problem of 
outage management but instead focuses on simple corrective maintenance. 
2. State-of-the-art 
Development and emergence of specialized hazard identification analyses focusing on 
communication technologies can be traced back to the late 1980-ies – early 1990-ies. In 1987 [2] 
HSE presented guidelines and safety principles concerning the use of programmable electronic 
systems (PES) in safety-critical domains. Following the clear need for a systematic hazard 
identification approach for PES Andow [3] proposed a 2-stage Computer Hazard and Operability 
(CHAZOP) analysis. CHAZOP for PES was built upon the HAZOP procedure which was well-
established by that time having been developed for analysing chemical process hazards [4]. The 
first stage of CHAZOP was a preliminary CHAZOP addressing system architecture, safety-related 
functions and consequences of PES failures, site power and utility failures. The second stage was 
a full-scale CHAZOP analysing the environment in which the computer system works, identifying 
deviations in input/output signals, considering all possible control schemes and protective systems. 
The use of an updated list of guidewords was in the core of CHAZOP. 
In 1992 Earthy published general guidelines for the use of HAZOP studies for software safety 
assessment [5]. As HAZOP studies for chemical and process plants are based on P&I diagrams, 
which cannot be used for the software analysis, the guidelines stress the importance of having 
proper basis for the safety assessment. As input to conducting a HAZOP study the guidelines 
suggest using task analysis models in the form of process flowcharts; while hardware (processors, 
   
storage devices, input/output peripherals) should be presented by schematic network charts. Data 
Flow diagrams and transaction networks should also be used to define tasks in the system. 
As further development, Burns and Pitblado [6] suggest a modification of the Failure Mode, Effect 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) with the use of HAZOP-type guidewords to identify hazards in 
PES. They propose guidewords in combination with variables such as “signal”, “information” and 
“action”. As input to the analysis, they name cause and effect charts and three types of diagrams: 
ladder diagrams, logic diagrams and vendor diagrams, with the logic diagram found to be the most 
convenient. The significant step forward in this paper was human factors analysis as part of hazard 
identification. 
New sets of guidewords, deviations and parameters were proposed for the HAZOP analyses of 
electronic devices and software tools by Chudleigh in [7], [8]. As the natural input to the hazard 
analysis of electronic devices, block and circuit diagrams should be used; while the use of the 
“Software with Pictures” tool was advocated to create dataflow representation for the software.  
Yet one more 3-stage methodology of hazard identification was developed by Mc Dermid and 
Pumfrey [9] to aid software design. Stage 1 addressed the software system representation that is 
made with the use of MASCOT [10]. In MASCOT components are represented by activities, 
Intercommunication Data areas and external devices that are all connected by information flows. 
Once the data type and path protocol of each information flow has been established (in the 
MASCOT diagram), at Stage 2 guidewords are defined by considering the interpretation of each 
failure class in the context of every combination of a data type and a path protocol. All failures are 
grouped into three classes as suggested by Bondavalli and Simoncini [11]: (1) service provision 
(omission, commission), (2) service timing (early, late), and (3) service value (coarse incorrect, 
subtle incorrect). At Stage 3 failure modes (deviations) are formulated following the recommended 
guidewords as well as causes and effects. 
Fenelon and Hebbron [12] summarize the experience gained by that time on applying CHAZOPs 
and come up with some general recommendations. The first recommendation concerns system 
representation, the importance of which is that it controls the effectiveness of the CHAZOP. 
Representation should be able to show the interaction between software and environment, as 
software in isolation is not harmful. It is noted that top-down hierarchically decomposed models to 
represent the software are problematic because they require the analyst to anticipate the required 
division of functionality; which may lead to arbitrary decision being taken and, as a consequence, 
hazard visibility may be impaired. The second recommendation says that in order for a set of 
notations, methods and tools to be truly well-integrated, three levels of integration must be 
achieved. (1) Operational integration: a set of tools must be created which can interoperate with 
each other in a synergistic fashion allowing information from diverse sources to be assembled into 
a coherent whole. (2) Methodological integration: the methods implemented by the software tools 
must be fundamentally compatible and there must be meaningful procedures for translating results 
obtained from one notation into raw data for another. (3) Semantic integration: the models 
underlying the notations must be semantically consistent so that data from one part of a diverse set 
of notations retains its meaning when exported to some other notation. Finally, the guidewords 
should depend on the level of abstraction, to generate a meaningful deviation. 
Kletz in [13] suggests a hazard identification method of computer controlled systems taking 
account of human error. The study starts with an “incident analysis” that derives causes and 
questions about past hazardous incidents. This is followed by a model of tasks and components 
that map questions and incidents with tasks. Each task is scrutinized against 5 considerations, 
   
each of which is associated with a set of attributes/guidewords. He proposes a new graphical 
technique, called “Event Time Diagram” for viewing and decomposing tasks. In general, the 
method appears rather complicated to use.  
Based on a literature review of hazard identification approaches Schubach [14] describes a 
modified computer hazard and operability study procedure. It is particularly stressed that HAZOP 
had been so successful because information about analyzed systems is provided in the appropriate 
form (P&IDs). Failure to create a concrete base documentation leads to poor analysis. A hazard 
analysis of computer controlled industrial processes should be based on P&IDs augmented with 
the necessary PES details. Finally, guidance to conduct the CHAZOP is provided as an 8-step 
activity procedure. 
A HAZOP focusing on the identification of operator errors in interactive systems leading to hazards 
is described in [15]. The methodology is, first, to formulate and represent operational scenarios and 
define user goals for them. Second, for each user goal determine possible action sequences 
(tasks). Third, examine tasks, using HAZOP-like guidewords. The core of the methodology is a task 
analysis (objects, actions, goals, tasks) of a safety-critical system that is supported by the use of 
the Sum language. The model produced by the task analysis shows all operations in the scenario 
and is used as a base for the HAZOP-like analysis. For each operation, guidewords are used to 
determine failure operations that in the following step are substituted with the normal operations in 
the model and the outcomes are observed. 
Hansen, Wells and Maier [16] describe HAZOP for UML design diagrams and is very much in line 
with the objectives of this paper with multiple aspects of the design and multiple HAZOP check 
lists. The approach uses guide words only, and as a result leaves the analysis approach somewhat 
incomplete, at least as far as the present objectives are concerned. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive approach to a hazard analysis of computer systems is described 
in Process Automation Handbook [17]. This is again a 2-phase CHAZOP analysis. Phase 1 
consists in preliminary CHAZOP integrated with a full CHAZOP. The preliminary CHAZOP includes 
strategic decisions about segregation policy, system layout, and the handling of gross failures. The 
results of the analysis are incorporated in the user requirements specification (USR) for the control 
system. The full CHAZOP goes first through each I/O signal to establish whether it is used for any 
safety related function. Then it identifies all communications channels used by any such signal. The 
following step scrutinizes the channels against deviations from intended functioning by the use of 
proper guidewords. In doing so, particular attention should be paid to the segregation and 
redundancy requirements. Finally, the results should be incorporated in the hardware aspects of 
the detailed functional specification (DFS). Phase 2 is basically a Control and Operability (COOP) 
study for the application software and human factors. In essence, a COOP study is used to check 
whether the design of the application software takes properly into account all conceivable and 
relevant human factors.  
Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the reviewed CHAZOP methodologies. 
3. Motivation for the present research 
Development of many modern operations management systems have failed, been delayed, or 
have led to major accidents [18]. Hazard identification and risk analysis have proved to be effective 
tools in developing more reliable and robust systems. As technology is developing fast, especially 
   
with the introduction of distributed communication systems, a new need for an effective hazard 
identification methodology has emerged. 
 
 
# Author Year Input Software Hardware Human Interaction 
Creative Thinking 
stimulated with 
1 Andow 1991 
- Computer System / Environment 
- I/O signals 
- Control Schemes  
  
- Guidewords 
- Guiding Questions 
2 Burns, Pitblado 1993 
- Logic Diagrams 
- VDU Displays 
- Control room layouts 
- Access times 
- System Interfaces 
- Job role & task definitions 











and    
Pumfrey 
1994 - MASCOT designs    
- Dynamically 
generated failure 
modes / deviations 
5 Kletz 1995 - Incident Analysis - Event Time Diagram    - Guiding Questions 
6 Schubach 1997 - P&IDs augmented with PES details    - Guiding Questions 








2004 - UML Diagrams    - Guidewords 
9 Love 2010 
- URS and DFS, P&I diagrams, 
Channel / Loop Diagrams, 
Software designs, Control System 
Architecture / Hardware, I/O 
Signals, Function Block 
Diagrams, Sequential Function 
Charts, Sequence Flow Diagrams 
   - Guidewords 
Table 1. Comparative review of CHAZOP analysis 
 
A number of CHAZOP variations have been suggested since the early 90’s. However, due to a 
number of reasons they are regarded as insufficient to address potential risks found in distributed 
communication systems. Some of the most important issues that current approaches face include: 
• They generally focus on specific aspects of the system, such as the software or hardware 
and not the system as a whole; interactions are disregarded or not treated sufficiently. 
• The base documentation proposed is inappropriate or insufficient; failure to create a 
concrete base documentation inevitably leads to poor analysis. 
   
• Several current check lists/methods published are similar but not consistent from publication 
to publication. The check lists tend to mix deviations appropriate to different technologies. 
• Many of the terms used are not orthogonal i.e. some disturbance types are covered by 
several checklist items. 
• Some sets of terms do not seem to be logically complete, at least with respect to our 
objective. 
The purpose of the current project is to develop and validate a methodology, able to address these 
issues and more specifically investigate in-depth the notions of completeness, through a multilevel 
- multidimensional analysis. 
4. Methodology 
HAZOP analysis, was selected as the base of our methodology as it has proved to be extremely 
successful in the process industries and its effectiveness and completeness has been well 
documented [19]. More specifically, the CHAZOP variant was chosen as a basis since it is directly 
relevant for control systems and process management. The success of HAZOP is dependent on 
using guide words and a related list of deviations to provide a sound basis for identifying starting 
points for causes and consequences of system failures, upsets and accidents. 
4.1 System Representation 
Conventional HAZOP uses piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) as the base 
documentation to represent the system under investigation. While this decision might seem trivial 
now, it plays a significant role in the success of the methodology. A documentation lacking to 
represent aspects of the system can and will most certainly lead to an incomplete hazard 
identification analysis, which can have disastrous aftermaths. Existing CHAZOP methodologies use 
a number of different base documentations, depending on the aspects of the system that they 
focus on. Nevertheless, none of them uses one with the ability to fully represent a distributed 
communication system.  
The base documentation we propose in this paper is summarized in Table 2. Further explanation is 
provided in the following sections. 
 
Documentation for System Representation 
1) Computer Network Diagram Overall System Architecture / Hardware 
2) UML Activity Diagram What activities are undertaken and by whom - 
Synchronization and Coordination 
3) IDEF0 diagram How activities are undertaken - Support system 
Table 2. Proposed documentation for system representation 
4.1.1 Computer Network Diagram (Appendices Figure 1) 
A computer network diagram in its classical form is a schematic depiction of all the nodes and 
connections found in a telecommunications network. In other words, it represents all the hardware 
used in a system including the transmitters, receivers and channels that information uses to travel 
   
throughout the network.  The computer network diagram is the perfect match to give an overview of 
the system architecture and to be used as a base for identifying potential hazards related to the 
hardware in place. 
4.1.2 UML Activity Diagram (Appendices Figure 2) 
The second document proposed, is the UML Activity Diagram. Activity diagrams are graphical 
representations of the activities, actions and workflows that are undertaken in a system. Essentially 
they are like flowcharts, however they are also equipped with means for expressing concurrency 
(join and split symbols); concurrency is an important aspect to take into account in hazard 
identification. The UML activity diagram is used to represent what activities are undertaken and by 
whom, including aspects of synchronization and coordination. 
4.1.3 IDEF0 Diagram (Appendices Figure 3) 
IDEF0 is a functional modelling methodology, widely used in describing both automated and non-
automated systems. The basic philosophy behind it is that every function or activity is represented 
by a box. Inputs are represented by arrows entering the left side of the activity box, while outputs 
by arrows exiting its right side. Moreover, the mechanisms used to accomplish the activity are 
represented by arrows entering the bottom of the box, while the controls that direct each activity by 
arrows entering the top. While the UML activity diagram is used to show the workflows into the 
system, the IDEF0 diagram is used to show the data flow, system control and the mechanics 
behind each activity; the support system. In other words, it is used to represent how each activity is 
undertaken and how the actors interact with the hardware, software or/and each other. 
The base documentation proposed was not selected arbitrary and it should be used combined in 
order to sufficiently represent a distributed communication system and all the interactions that 
come with it. Another reason behind our proposal is the fact that the above-mentioned 
representations become used in the industry and engineers become more and more familiar with 
them. 
4.2 Study Team 
One of the main features of the HAZOP analysis family is that they are essentially group activities. 
Ideally the team performing the analysis should have members representing a range of expertise 
and disciplines. The premise underlying this is that no one can have a range of knowledge which 
can cover all aspects of failure and error. This premise is certainly true for distributed information 
systems, where knowledge of the technology, the programming and the application are important. 
Through the years, HAZOP has achieved an important status in some industries, to the extent of it 
becoming a legal requirement in some areas. The reasons for this are that a multi person, multi 
discipline view of an system is obtained, that the view is constrained by the methodology to be a 
consensus, and that the methodology is aimed at proposing methods to improve safety. 
The methodology proposed in this paper suggests as a bare minimum for the study team to consist 
of: 
• A software engineer 
• A network architect/engineer 
• A maintenance engineer (since the project studied concerns maintenance, more generally a 
problem domain expert) 
   
• A system operator  
4.3 Multilevel – Multidimensional Analysis 
Existing CHAZOP variations use a list of guidewords and/or relative system parameters in order to 
stimulate creative thinking for identifying potential hazards and operability problems. However, we 
already mentioned some of the issues that these approaches face. 
Hulin and Tschachtli [20] identified in particular four methodological and technical insufficiencies 
that guideword-based approaches face; 
• Incompleteness; proposed guidewords cannot identify all potential deviations. 
• Nonsensicality; some guidewords are not straightforward, thus they cannot be logically 
associated with any deviation. 
• Redundancy; a number of guidewords can lead to the same deviation. 
• Ambiguity; one guideword can lead to a number of different deviations. 
The methodology we propose aims to directly deal with the issues of incompleteness and 
nonsensicality and create a logical framework where, while redundancy and ambiguity naturally 
exist, they can be easily handled and used to one’s advantage. 
The multilevel - multidimensional methodology divides the given system into levels and then uses a 
multidimensional guiding philosophy for identifying potential hazards. At the current state of the toy 
system design, the methodology divides the system in two levels; 
• Hardware Level, including all the transmitters, receivers, channels and I/O signals. 
• Human Interaction Level between software, hardware and operators. 
For each level of the design, an appropriate deviation check list is developed, by taking a 
generalized multi-dimensional functional failure check list and interpreting this in relation to the 
actual design to be analysed. The master check list was obtained by dimensional analysis of the 
aspects of functioning and functional failure [21]. 
Starting with the hardware level, the study team uses as input the computer network diagram. In 
order to stimulate creative thinking towards hazardous deviations, a two-dimensional guiding 
framework is used, Table 3. Since we deal with hardware components at this level, the first 
dimension of the framework separates the components in “continuous” working ones and “on 
demand” working ones. A third row is also used to represent both types of components. The 
second dimension classifies deviations according to three different criteria: “working state” of the 
component, “time” and “component interaction” with the rest of the system.  
By looking at the two dimensional matrix, it is fairly straightforward to populate it with potential 
guiding deviations.  This list is a subset of the more extensive dimensional analysis of deviations, 
being selected for application for distributed control and management systems.  
For the human interaction level, the study team uses as input both the UML activity diagram and 
the IDEF0 functional block diagram. Creative thinking is also stimulated here through the use of a 
multidimensional guiding framework, Table 4, although the dimensions are selected to match the 
human interaction with the software, hardware and other humans. The first dimension separates 
the human interaction in regard to the “data” that is being transferred, the “time” of the interaction 
and finally the “place” that the interaction occurs. The second dimension considers all the different 
possible interactions that take place in a distributed communication system. More specifically, we 
have interactions between human - machine and human - human. Human - machine interactions 
   
can be further separated into “input-to-machine” interactions and “output-from-machine”. Human - 
human interactions are represented in the table with the “interaction with other human” column. 
 
 Deviations Related to 
Intended to 
work Working State Time Component Interaction 
Continuous 
- Working 
- Partially working 
- Not working (fails 
while working) 
- Interrupted 
- Intermittent Not Applicable 
On Demand 
- Works on demand 
- Partially works on 
demand 
- Fails on demand 
- Premature / Early (Too 
early starting)  
- Delayed / Late (Too late 
starting) 
- Too fast 
- Too slow 
- Duplication 
- Omission 
- Sequence error 
Both - Wrong function 
- Prolonged / Extended (too 
long duration) 
- Curtailed / Partial (too 
short duration) 
- Synchronization failure 
- Wrong Version  
- No/Limited Access 
- Interference 
- Overload 
Table 3. Hardware level – Multidimensional guidance matrix 
 
 Deviations Related to 
In Regard 




- No input 
- More input 
- Less input / Incomplete 
- Wrong input 
- No/ Limited access 
- No/Loss output 
- Overload (too much output) 
- Less output / Incomplete 
- Wrong output 




- Early input  
- Late input 
- Input Before 
- Input After 
- Synchronization error 
- Early output 
- Late output 
- Output Before 
- Output After 
Not Applicable 
Place - Inaccessible machine for input 
- Inaccessible machine for 
output - Inaccessible 
Table 4. Human Interaction Level – Multidimensional guidance matrix 
The matrix is populated once again with possible deviations that can be used as a guidance from 
the study team. 
While most methodologies propose the use of guidewords and checklists to identify potential 
deviations, the methodology presented in this paper recognizes that there are different design 
   
domains, and that these will require different check lists, or at least different vocabulary, and will 
need to use a multilevel framework. The higher levels of analysis “inherit” the deviations and 
consequences from lower levels, and lower level consequences are used to supplement the check 
lists used at higher levels. Although the multilevel concept has been proposed before, the use of 
dimensions gives a sense of “logical completeness” and offers a systematic way to the study team 
to consider possible deviations. The complete steps of the methodology are presented in Figure 4 
in the Appendices  
5. Case study 
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our approach and validate the methodology, a simple 
corrective maintenance scenario was developed. The scenario involves a Nuclear Power Plant and 
concerns design of a work order processing system in a routine corrective maintenance. It was 
ambitiously titled Distributed Maintenance Management System (DMMS). This allows us to draw 
on experience from earlier systems developed for management of integrity of safety critical 
systems. For simplicity this “toy” design does not include outage management, preventive 
maintenance, condition based maintenance or diagnostic support, and the safety management 
aspects are highly simplified.   
The scenario involves the communication of four different actors, distributed across the NPP; 
• Operations Centre; Responsible for all maintenance operations, monitoring and updating the 
work schedule. 
• Work Planning Centre; Responsible for physically opening and closing work windows/orders, 
planning and re-planning. 
• Main Control Centre; Responsible for overall plant safety, issues clearance orders, tag out 
papers etc. 
• Field Workers; Receive and perform work orders. 
Following the methodology, in order to represent the system, a computer network diagram, a UML 
activity diagram and an IDEF0 functional block diagram were developed (see Appendices Figure 1, 
Figure 2, and Figure 3 respectively). 
6. Results 
The analyses for the selected system were carried out by a team of three, one with risk analysis 
experience, one with IT experience and one with maintenance experience. This would be a bare 
minimum for a practical project, but it satisfies at least the requirement for a multi-disciplinary 
approach. Some results of the analysis are presented in the Appendices Figure 5. 
The DMMS was analysed first at the communications and hardware level. This took six hours, 
identified 20 failure possibilities, no design errors, and 11 proposals for safety measures. The level 
1 functional analysis was more separate, with the analysis spread over several days. It took a total 
of 22 man-hours, identified 3 design errors, and 44 proposals for safety measures. 
At the outset of the functional analysis, the support systems were recorded on the IDEF0, in 
accordance with the IDEF notation standard. This allowed the results from the hardware level 
analysis to be cross-referenced to the higher level functions which they would affect. The low level 
disturbances could then be “inherited upwards” and provided additional causes for the higher level 
disturbances. 
   
One of the most surprising results from the analysis was the early detection of a major design error 
in the initial concept, within the first hour of work. This would presumably have been found later in 
the design process, even in the absence of the HAZOP analysis, because of the simplicity of the 
design. However the example illustrates the way in which the performance of systems can be 
impacted by errors at the conceptual stage, especially in complex systems. 
The most important result from any HAZOP is the documentation of existing safety measures, the 
proposals for new measures, and the allocation of responsibility for error remediation. Because of 
the stage of design it was not possible to distinguish between “existing” and “proposed”. The list 
could nevertheless go forward to later stages of design, for evaluation and direct incorporation. 
After evaluation, these could be consolidated into a “safety and reliability philosophy document” of 
the kind which is at present used in the field of process engineering. 
One this that became obvious during the HAZOP was the importance of “design rules” which were 
being used particularly for selecting safeguards, but also a supplement to the deviation check-lists. 
These correspond to the design review rules which are actually used alongside the formal HAZOP 
in process engineering applications. An example of a design rule is: 
Any function in a system can be interrupted, either because of hardware failure or due to a 
mismatch between the function preconditions and the actual state of the external world. For any 
function or functional sequence there should be a) a possibility to put the function “on hold”, and b) 
a recovery function. 
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
The project is at a very early stage, so that it is too early to draw general conclusions. The future 
development includes: 
• Extension of the “toy” system to deeper levels in order to validate the principle of multilevel 
analysis. 
• Further collection and documentation of design rules  
• Extension of the methodology to the human machine interactions level (level 3 in our 
conjectured design process. 
• Comparison of the results of the analysis with an existing database of information 
management system failures. 
• Evaluation of the different design notations. 
• Development of a guideline for selection and development of safeguards for information 
processing systems which will complement the hazard analysis methodology. 
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9. Appendices 





   




   
Figure 3: IDEF0 Diagram - Corrective Maintenance Scenario 
 
 
   
Figure 4: Multilevel - Multidimensional HAZOP Procedure 
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Figure 5: Multilevel – Multidimensional HAZOP Results (one-page extract from the report) 
Analysis MLHAZOP for IDEF0 Level 1 Specification Interface Deviation Analysis Participants: JRT Date: 25/02/2016 
Object Deviation Causes Consequences Existing safeguards Impact from Recommendations 
A1 Identify 
need for WO No input 
Sensor malfunction 
Alarm and status display 
malfunction function 
Alarm and status 
Window not displayed or covered. 
Alarm and status display overload 
Failures from level 4, process display 
and operator work station 
Initially no work order 
created, delay in activating 
corrective work 
-> Delay in corrective 
maintenance 
--> Failure escalation 
--> Consequence escalation 




systems (fire, smoke, leak, 
gas, radiation) 
Redundancy e.g. in the form 







 More Input Too many problems arising, overload, operator cannot respond As above, No input 
As above, No input 
Also: 




System input  
 Less input Alarm or display system failure As above, No input As above, No input Level 0, System input  
 Incomplete input As above, No input As above, No input  
Level 0, 
System input  
 Wrong input 












from real ones is a 
typical first step in 
maintenance 
  
